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U.S. ENERGY POLICY AND THE 
PRESUMPTION OF MARKET FAILURE 
Peter Z. Grossman 
Over the last 35 years, the U.S. government has embarked on sev-
eral major projects to spur the commercial development of energy 
technologies intended to substitute for conventional energy resources, 
especially fossil fuels. Those efforts began with the 1973 energy crisis 
when President Nixon became the first U.S. leader to announce a plan 
for energy autarky. Presidents Ford and Carter followed Nixon's 
"Project Independence" with similar pledges. But beginning with 
Ford's 1975 energy act, plans for energy independence were tied 
directly to the development of new, alternative energy technologies. 
Under President Carter in particular, the federal government 
embarked on highly publicized, heavily funded efforts at developing 
new technologies with specific timetables for commercial entry and, in 
a few cases, a timetable for mass market substitution. Current man-
dates for ethanol and other biofuels fit this latter objective. 
The presumption underlying government alternative energy pro-
grams, including the ethanol program, is that voluntary market action 
is insufficient to develop new energy sources. Therefore, govern-
ment has to step in to induce the technological development the 
market fails to create. Only through government intervention, 
according to this logic, can the market failure be corrected and the 
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social benefits of alternative energy technologies be realized 
(Weimar and Vining 1992). 
Whether a market failure has or has not existed with respect to 
alternative energy technologies, it is nonetheless relevant to ask 
whether the government's action creates a solution or a failure of its 
own. The importance of government failure has been highlighted in 
recent years as government efforts in such diverse areas as inland 
waterway development, antitrust law, and public transportation 
appear to produce far more costs than benefits, and sometimes may 
worsen whatever market failures they were intended to correct 
(Winston 2006).1 The evidence suggests that with respect to alterna-
tive energy development, government failure has in fact been a more 
persistent and costly problem than market failure. 
This article will argue that government energy policy has been 
based on faulty premises not only about the existence of market fail-
ure but also about tlle nature and process of innovation. Moreover, 
as this article will show, there is evidence that the private sector can 
develop energy alternatives more efficiently than the government. 
The article is organized as follows: first, I discuss the basic idea of 
market failure and how it has influenced U.S. energy policy. I also 
suggest that governmental solutions would have been unlikely to suc-
ceed even if a market failure had been correctly identified. Next, I 
focus on three efforts at government-directed innovation: synfuels, 
nuclear fusion electric generation, and the high-mileage automobile. 
All three were given Significant funding and programmatic timeta-
bles witll benchmarks of success. None of those timetables were met, 
few of tlle benchmarks were achieved, and development funds were 
largely wasted. Finally, I end with a discussion of how the federal 
government continues to pursue the same kinds of policies tllat offer 
tlle promise of more failure. 
The Market for Innovation: Market Failure or 
Government Failure? 
Ronald Coase (1964) argued that all fonns of economic organiza-
tion-markets, finns, and government-are "more or less failures." 
lCoase (1964) raised the issue of government failure. Wolf (1979) provides a theo-
retical foundation for "non market" failures; Zerbe and McCurdy (2000) take issue 
with market failure as a justification for government intervention generally. 
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That is, no real-world arrangement of economic instihltions leads to 
ideal allocative or productive efficiency of the sort represented in the 
neoclassical model of perlect competition, which by definition allo-
cates resources through markets so that there are no alternative 
arrangements that would lead to a higher level of social welfare. But 
since that model is based on unrealistic assumptions, Coase argued, 
it had to be assumed that all real-world markets fail to some extent, 
a point elaborated by Demsetz (1969). Of course, firms and govern-
ment command systems clearly fail as well, and substituting com-
mand for markets does not guarantee success. The goal, Coase 
suggested, is to organize ,my particular type of economic activity 
using the form of organization that fails the least in a given situation.2 
Of course, one cannot know with certainty that one fonn of organi-
zation will fail less than another in a particular circumstance, 
although experience should provide some gmd,mce. With respect to 
government energy development programs, there is 35 years of 
experience to draw on, but this history seems to be entirely ignored 
by decisionmakers in proposing new programs. 
How is it that the alternative energy market is presumed to fail? A 
new energy technology could potentially be worth billions of dollars, 
but an entrepreneur must bear a considerable development expense 
while his reward is uncertain. Of course, the greatest uncertainty is 
simply: Will the technology be marketable? But even if it is, the 
entrepreneur may be unable to keep others from cashing in on his 
efforts with competing products, and certainly he cannot gain some 
benefits that are attained by society as a whole. For example, a new 
technology might reduce the need for defense spending to protect 
oil supplies, but that benefit-while clearly substantial-cannot be 
captured by the entrepreneur who created the technology. The 
problem of uncertain or unattainable benefits but fully internalized 
development costs means that entrepreneurs will be reluct,mt to 
invest in innovative energy technologies, which will consequently be 
undersupplied if left to the market alone (Arrow 1962). 
But even if this premise is accepted, it is not immediately clear 
what government can or should do to correct it. That is, with respect 
2Demsetz (1969) tenned the comparison of ideal and real-world "institutional 
ammgements"' the "nilVana approach."' This is in c-ontrast to the "<."Omparative insti-
tution approach"' that looks at alternative real-world arrangements to see which is 
"best able to cope"' with a particular economic circumstance. 
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to energy policy, what can government do that will lead to a success-
ful new energy technology and not produce an even larger govern-
ment failure? Policymakers have tried numerous schemes, some as 
low-cost and low-profile as simple infonnation gathering. However, 
the most costly and tl1e most visible by far have been efforts to 
induce innovation. Typically, policymakers have relied either on pro-
grams that prOvide incentives (usually tax preferences) to adopt a 
new technology or that undertake technology development directly. 
Neither of tl10se types of programs has been successful, but the 
second, direct development, is especially problematic in principle as 
well as practice. Government programs to create commercially 
viable alternative technologies of any kind rest on three implicit 
assumptions-all of them, at best, dubious. 
First, and perhaps most important, is tl1at government must 
assume that innovation is a demand-side phenomenon. U.S. energy 
policymakers appear to believe that since consumers want alternative 
energy technologies, someone should have built and marketed tl1em. 
Since no one has, tl1e assumption is tl1at the market is failing to pro-
vide the incentives for innovators to act. 
But tl1e concept of demand-led innovation has very little empiri-
cal support. In the 1960s, a few scholars-notably Jacob Schmookler 
(1966)-attempted to link tl1e technological developments of tl1e 
Industrial Revolution to a surge in demand. This theory seemed 
especially inviting at the time because it echoed tl1e Keynesian 
demand-side perspective that dominated macroeconomic theory. 
But the demand-side explanation has not survived careful analy-
sis. Today, nearly all scholars agree that innovation is a supply-side 
phenomenon (Mokyr 1977). As Natl1an Rosenberg (1976), a leading 
economic historian of technology, has argued, scientific knowledge 
evolves if not randomly at least unevenly and its employment in mar-
ketable developments is certainly unpredictable and not necessarily 
consistent witl1 consumers' desires at a given point in time. The com-
plexity of science makes it hard to foresee, much less to program, 
what kinds of new ideas can generate what kinds of new products. 
Only after technolOgical developments occur, will entrepreneurs 
evaluate opportunities for commercial development, and the verdict 
on whether they are right or wrong will be rendered in tl1e market-
place. Though supplY-Side theories of innovation have had much 
more success in explaining technolOgical development, government 
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alternative energy programs directed at correcting the market's fail-
ure to supply innovative products take for granted a demand-side 
explanation to the innovation process. 
Some experts argue that government can compel firms to inno-
vate through the use of both incentives and disincentives. In the lit-
erature, this concept is sometimes referred to as "technology 
forcing." The catalytic converter in cars is the example most fre-
quently noted (Genu-d and Lave 2003). Government commanded a 
reduction in automobile pollution and tlle converter resulted (albeit 
a few years later them mandated). But tlle converter was not intend-
ed to compete with an existing conventional technology as alternative 
energy technologies are expected to do. In fact, there is simply no 
example of government "forcing" a commercially viable alternative 
energy product. 
The second assumption is that if a technology has been demon-
strated to be possible, government support will be needed to make it 
commercially viable. Exactly what tllis is based on is unclear. 
Government support is not by its nature deSigned to produce com-
petitive market results. Instead, as Public Choice tlleory e~plains, 
government intervention creates competition among entrepreneurs 
primarily to gain government SUppOlt. In tlle very nature of tlle fund-
ing process, money for development will often go to tlle entrepre-
neur tllat (a) is most likely to meet political goals of legislators, and 
(b) does tlle best job of convincing government ofBcials of tlle supe-
riority of his approach. Once support has been obtained, tlle entre-
preneur has no need to work toward market competition and, in fact, 
has a great motivation to prevent market competition from arising. 
Overall, tllis situation provides more of an incentive for innovative 
rent seeking tllan for commercialization of innovative technologies 
(Cohen and Noll 1991). 
The problem is not only how government dispenses support but 
also on what projects. Technology policy implicitly proceeds from tlle 
assumption that if tllere are competing technical ideas, government 
bureaucrats are competent to choose tlle winner. But governments 
worldwide have overwhelmingly failed at this sort of task. In 
the1980s, for example, Japem was touted as the model of successful 
government-led industrial policy. Of course, tlns assertion was wrong 
in almost every respect, but it was most obviously off tlle mark witll 
regard to tlle development of new technologies. Japemese technology 
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policy was a fiasco. Decisionmakers backed such ideas as an analog 
standard for HDTV and a so-called "next generation" computer, but 
they produced no significant commercial products and wasted enor-
mous resources (Beltz 1993, Pollack 1992). 
The third assumption in U.S. technology policy is that if a technol-
ogy is shown to be technically feasible and appears cost competitive 
with a conventional resource, rapid and widespread adoption will 
soon follow. Put a bit differently, the assumption is government 
backing will lead quickly to market domination. In general, there is 
no consideration given to the process of technological adoption and 
the nature of market behavior. This process unfolds over time. It can 
take decades for full market saturation to ensue. Even when a tech-
nology seems to offer superior benefits on some margins, consumers 
may resist, preferring to wait until a technology is proven at least as 
reliable as-and more desirable than-the conventional product it is 
to replace. For instance, compact florescent light bulbs save money 
in tlle long nm versus the more familiar incandescent lights, but peo-
ple resist tllem, it is thought, not only because of high consumer dis-
count rates but also because of noticeable differences in tlle 
character of the light produced (Cole and Grossman 2004). In any 
case, government energy programs that typically include specific 
timetables for both the beginning and extent of market penetration 
necessarily assume tllat when a product is ready for the market it will 
be consumed (Cassedy and Grossman 1990). 
There is a way in which this outcome could be assured: 
Government could make a technology policy entirely coercive. By a 
given date people would have to adopt a technology or face fines or 
even imprisonment.3 But most programs for alternative energy 
assume no coercion but ratller a process by which market success 
simply occurs. Yet tllat process is unknown because, as tlle next sec-
tion makes clear, alternative energy programs have always (often dra-
matically) failed. 
1'hat was in fact the case initially with California's zero emissions vehicle (ZEV) 
mandate, where automakers who failed to offer a sufficient percentage of ZEVs 
faced "stiff fimmcial penalties" (Economist 1991), penalties that were not imposed 
when automakers failed to meet the mandate. 
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The History of Alternative Energy Programs 
Beginning in 1973 with the energy crisis and President Nixon's 
announcement of "Project Independence," the U.S. govemment has 
provided funding and other resources to numerous altemative ener-
gy technology programs at various levels of support. The largest 
share of govemment funding, of course, has gone to development 
projects that specifically have aimed at the creation of viable market 
altematives to conventional energy technologies and resources. A 
study of funding costs and benefits between 1980 and 2000 noted 
expenditures of more than $13 billion (Fri 2006). While some 
research produced measurable welfare gains, this research was 
almost always low cost and low tech. Of an estimated $40 billion in 
research-related benefits nearly all came from very modest research 
efforts. The study estimated that 0.1 percent of all money spent on 
energy R&D produced 75 percent of the benefits. The most produc-
tive research was related to window insulation technology, lighting 
ballasts, and refrigerator efficiency. More than $9 billion, however, 
was spent on high visibility altemative energy development projects 
intended to induce innovation and overcome perceived market fail-
ures; these "produced no quantifiable economic benefit" (Fri 2006). 
Three examples follow. 
The Synfuels Program 
In 1973, one altemative that drew immediate attention from gov-
emment officials was synthetic fuel. "Synfuels" refers to cmy uncon-
ventional source or form of oil or gas. For example, huge oil deposits 
are locked in shale in the westem United States, but extracting the 
synthetic oil is complex, costly, cmd environmentally suspect. The 
focus in U.S. synfuels development has been to some extent on shale, 
but it has mostly centered on the liquefaction or gasification of coal, 
the fossil fuel resource we have in greatest abundance. 
Synfuels research began with a goal other than that of correcting 
market failure. At first, synfuels were seen as a matter of national 
security in time of war. In March 1944, Congress passed tlle 
Syntl1etic Liquid Fuels Act, with $30 million directed to research cmd 
development to detennine how best to produce synfuels-from coal 
or shale deposits-in the event of wartime shortages of convention-
al petroleum. 
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Promoters of synfuels, notably officials of the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines, became highly optimistic about what could be achieved 
through synfuel development. By 1948, it was asserted by one scien-
tist that synthetic gasoline would soon be cost competitive with the 
conventional oil-derived fuel (New York Times 1948), a belief reiter-
ated by the Bureau of Mines a year later. The Bureau's Office of 
Synthetic Liquid Fuels proposed an $8.7 billion government-direct-
ed investment to reach an output level of 1 million barrels of oil per 
day (New York Times 1949).4 
Government needed to be in charge, suggested the Bureau, 
because the agency saw a market failure of a kind that would inhibit 
subsequent development of synfuels. Why was private industry 
unwilling to invest in processes like synfuels? It was not the case that 
there was proprietary government ownership of the technology. 
Methods of coal liquefaction and gasification had been known for 
decades (Ridgeway 1982). The answer seemed to be that private 
entrepreneurs ("the market") lacked sufficient foresight. No private 
investor would be willing to take on an apparently profitable venture 
in synfuels because the qucmtity of oil was great and tl1e price of con-
ventional fuels low. But would it stay low? To many observers, tl1e 
answer was "no." As Ridgeway (1982) notes, newspapers of tl1e day 
were given to headlines such as "Oil Shortages Here to Stay!" How 
would we supply our needs unless we developed tl1is technology? 
But tl1e $8.7 billion was not appropriated, and demonstration proj-
ects showed tl1at liquefied coal could not be produced at anywhere 
close to the price of conventional oil. The coal-to-liquid effort was 
dropped in tl1e United States in 1952. 
But after 1973, synfuels became a key element in Project 
Independence. Some interest was directed at shale oil, but most 
attention was given to coal, of which tl1e United States had proven 
reserves that were expected to last more than 200 years. Nixon's pro-
posals called initially for study: the Federal Energy Office was to 
evaluate what kinds of programs would "be needed to stimulate 
domestic production" of shale oil as well as oil cmd gas from coal 
(Nixon 1974), but production was assumed likely to follow. 
Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford was more explicit. His revised 
Project Independence (a revision in part for the timing of "indepen-
4Inflation-adjusted, this amount would be almost $80 billion 2009 dollars. 
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dence" from 1980 to 1985) called for the development of "20 major 
synthetic fuel plants" (Ford 1975) that would be initiated with $6 bil-
lion in federally guaranteed loans to private industry (Cowan 1975). 
Ford's chief energy advisor, Frank Zarb (whose fonnal title was 
Director of tlle Federal Energy Administration but who became 
known as America's "energy czar") and Robert Fri, deputy head of 
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), 
told Congress that by the early 1980s synfuel capacity "could" be 
350,000 barrels per day, which tllen "could" rise to 1 million barrels 
by 1985. Fri tllought that output would be expanded to 5 million by 
1995 and 10 million by 2000. Zarb spoke also of a govemment "cor-
poration" to be called tlle Energy Independence AUtllOrity (EIA) to 
manage syntlletic fuel funding, an agency that as projected would 
control massive resources for the development and commercializa-
tion of synfuels (Cowan 1975). 
Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller (1976) spelled out the 
nature of the EIA in a New York Times op-ed, "Toward Energy 
Independence." The EIA would have a board of five politically 
appOinted directors and a budget of $100 billion, $75 billion of which 
would be raised through a speCial issue of govemment bonds. 
Rockefeller was explicit that such a corporation with its vast funding 
,md power was necessary because private capital markets would not 
prOvide the money for a purpose that was, in his view, a matter of 
urgent national interest. He argued that the market was failing 
because of the high level of "uncertainties tllat exist in tlns area." 
Rockefeller himself appeared to be certain that while some energy 
investments would fail to payoff, overall this govemment venture 
would be profitable as well as a boon to national security. 
Ford's synfuels efforts went nowhere, however. The EIA was not 
in the bill that came to Congress, and the House of Representatives 
rejected ,illY loan guarantees to private businesses even after tlley 
were trimmed from $6 billion to $3.5 billion. The House of 
Representatives, led by Indiana Democrat Ray Madden, who disput-
ed the implicit market failure rationale by calling tlle bill "a giveaway 
to the major energy companies" (Madden 1976), defeated all synfu-
el funding by a one-vote majority. 
Before the end of the decade, however, the synfuels issue loomed 
larger than ever and the market failure aspects were made more 
expliCit. President Carter's first energy message in 1977 supported a 
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"major" increase in R&D for synfuels, both synthetic oil and natural 
gas, because the conventional resources of both, according to Carter 
and other officials, were rapidly running out. In fact, in his address, 
Ceuter (1977) suggested that global oil supplies might be depleted by 
the end of the 1980s.5 
The intensity of the effort grew in 1979 when conflict in the 
Persian Culf caused the price of oil to rise, eventually reaching a high 
of $35 per barrel in 1981 (about $84 in 2009 dollars). Consequently, 
Carter proposed a new energy program witll a massive synfuels 
effort, for both liquid and gaseous products, as the centerpiece. The 
Carter program envisioned a government investment of $88 billion 
(over $233 billion' in 2009 dollars) through the Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation (SFC), with a programmatic goal of 500,000 barrels a 
day of syntlletic oil (or gaseous equivalent) by 1987 and 2 million bar-
rels per day (or equivalent) by 1992 (Lyons 1980). The program was 
so large in scale and adopted by both houses of Congress so quickly 
that arguably the entire enterprise could be characterized as a pan-
icked response to a perceived crisis, which under ordinary circum-
stances would never have been entertained (Abari 1987). 
Still, tlle vast undertaking was justified by market failure argu-
ments. In this instance government action was needed not only 
because of the failure of capital markets and investor uncertainty, but 
also because (echOing tlle 1940s rationale) the energy market itself 
lacked foreSight. In 1980, government analysts, as well as some in the 
private sector, were forecasting a steadily rising real price of oil to 
$120 per barrel by the mid 1990s, which, if true, would have made 
synfuels development profitable, and so should have induced signifi-
cant investment in synfuels by energy companies. But investors just 
were not coming forward, leaving achievable gains unclaimed-a 
sure sign of market failure, according to tllose who supported tlle 
Carter program (Coulder and Robinson 1982). 
But everything about the program was misconceived, and the 
decision to invest so much in synfuels seemed to critics an "emotion-
al and romantic" response (Lee, Ball, and Tabors 1990). The price 
prediction was based on assumptions of declining supply coupled 
witll rising demand, economic assumptions deservedly termed 
5Carter's position was supported by a CIA study (Newsweek 1977), but the view was 
hardly umUlimous. For example, a Rand study in 1978 argued that there was a 60-90 
year supply of conventional oil world\vide (Oil and Gas JOflmaI1978). 
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"farcical," (Cohen and Noll 1991). There was in fact no reason to 
believe that supply was declining worldwide, much less "running 
out." Higher prices in 1980 were spurring companies to search for 
more conventional oil and to find ways to enhance resource extrac-
tion. Arguably, the market, which was not investing in synfuels, was 
giving a useful and it turned out correct interpretation of future ener-
gy scarcity. Nonetheless, Congress passed the Synthetic 
FuelslDefense Production Act by a four-to-one margin. As one crit-
ic later put it, the synfuels bill was a "quick-fix ... high tech solution 
that embodied the panacea of massive investment and wondrous 
technologies" (Willis 1987). 
It was quickly apparent, however, that the technology was neither 
economically viable nor sufficiently proven to be undertaken on such 
a vast scale (Stanfield 1984). As Willis (1987) noted, even as the proj-
ect was being launched, five different agencies of government 
including the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) criticized the 
program because the technology was untried and tlle goals overly 
optimistic. 
The SFC was mismanaged as well as misconceived and the 
incoming Reagan administration (after arguably worsening the cor-
poration's management) eventually terminated tlle project, with a 
resulting waste of between $1 billion and $3 billion.6 The project had 
missed all of its benchmarks, failing to create tlle great technolOgical 
feat Carter had envisioned. It has been argued (Cohen and Noll 
1991) that the synfuels program was closed down in part because it 
lacked a particular constituency in Congress detennined to fight for 
its preservation as a way to please local voters. It had been a program 
developed in a crisis atmosphere and in tlle aftennath no one had a 
vested interest in preserving it. But the synfuels act of 1980 certain-
ly cannot be said to have righted a market failure-tllere was no mar-
ket reason to invest heavily in synfuels technology, and market 
6Shortly after taking office in 1981, President Ronald Reagan fired the entire board 
of the SFC and made new appointments led by oil services executive Edward 
Noble, who became SFC's chainnan, and Victor A. Schroeder, an Atlanta real estate 
executive (Witll no other apparent connection to the energy business than that he 
was a friend of Noble's), who was named president. By 1983, tllree of tile SFC's 
otller directors were publicly calling for Schroeder's ouster, charging "mismanage-
ment ,md improprieties." In August 1983, Schroeder reSigned. AltilOugh the Justice 
Department dropped a criminal investigation into Schroeder's conduct because of 
"insufficient evidence," tllere seemed reason to believe til at the SFC had been mis-
lmmaged under his watch (Kurtz 1983). 
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participants did not do so. Market failure presumes finns fail to 
respond to market signals. Yet, government ignored the signals mar-
ket participants received. The market was essentially correct wlrue 
government f"rued. 
Nuclear Fusion 
Pure scientifIc research is often cited as an unambiguous example 
of a case where market failure is inevitable (Salter and Martin 2001), 
the kind of good that markets will inevitably underprovide. 
Knowledge acquired from such research has social and commercial 
payoffs that are highly uncertain but potentially enonnous. There 
may be no way to quantifY the market potential of some concept that 
has not even been shown to have a practical application. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs will have little incentive to invest in such research. 
According to theory, the market will do too little pure research ,md 
government R&D funding may be the only means of realizing the 
social benefits that the universe of ideas could one day produce. 
Nuclear fusion research would seem the ideal example of tins 
problem (Roncaglia 1989). Nuclear fusion energy, the harneSSing of 
hydrogen fusion reactions to produce heat and tl1US electricity, has 
never been proven practical but in tlleory could become what has 
been termed a "backstop" energy technology (Nordhaus 1979). That 
is, if fusion energy could be controlled so til at fusing hydrogen atoms 
produces more energy tllan is required to induce fusion reactions in 
tile first place, tile world would have an energy source for the indef-
inite future. But at the present time, alJ work on controlling fusion 
energy (the hydrogen bomb is an example of demonstrated uncon-
trolJed fusion energy) represents a pure research effort. The princi-
ple of fusion energy control is known, but harnessing it so as to 
produce more energy them tl1e process consumes has never been 
aclneved. Because the investment in such research is so large ,md the 
outcome highly uncertain, private entrepreneurs, it is assumed, will 
not undertake it. 
The U.S. government has supported fusion research since tile 
1950s, when entl1Usiastic researchers suggested a fusion analog to 
the nuclear fission reactor was only a few years from realization.7 
'Fusion energy scientist Lyman Spitzer said in 1951 that a fusion power system 
would be ready in five years (Carey 1990). 
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While research did not in fact lead to even a prototype fusion reac-
tor, the research concept enjoyed modest public funding from the 
1950s through the early 1970s. By 1973, before energy became a 
major public policy concern, fusion was receiving about $95 million 
annually for basic study of a variety of reactor concepts. 
In response to the energy crisis, the Nixon administration argued 
for increased funding of fusion as part of Project Independence, 
even though supporters of fusion admitted that a prototype was still 
years away. Still, promoters contended that a working fusion reactor 
and electric power generator could be achieved in a relatively ShOlt 
amount of time if more funding were provided. For example, in 
1975, Robert Seamans Jr., the director of ERDA, suggested that a 
prototype demonstration reactor could be readied by the mid-1980s 
with commercialization likely a decade later (New York Times 1975). 
Throughout the late 1970s, money for fusion research grew and 
by the end of the decade had tripled to over $300 million per year. 
But with the second energy crisis in 1979, a new urgency was added 
to this program as well. While economic theory might have justified 
increases in funding for fusion research, in fact the nature of the pro-
gram was radically altered. Congress, led by Representative Mike 
McCormack (D-Wash.), initiated and passed the Magnetic Fusion 
Energy Engineering Act of 1980 (MFEE), which envisioned $20 bil-
lion for an "Apollo-like mode" project to first prove the prinCiple of 
controlled fusion by 1990, and then develop a prototype commercial 
fusion reactor by 2001.8 Moreover, Congress speCified the basic 
design, called a tokomak. The measure passed overwhelmingly 
(there were only 7 votes against in the House of Representatives). 
Though the tokomak design, using magnetic confinement of high-
temperature fusion plasma, had seemed the most promising 
approach for some years, it did not have the unconditional support of 
the scientific community or even the Department of Energy. The 
DOE, while in support of additional research funding, objected to 
measures that foreclosed other options besides the tokomak 
(Business Week 1980). DOE scientists also argued that the timetable 
was too optimistic. Despite opposition within his own administration, 
President Carter sided with Congress and Signed the bill. 
&rhis amount ($20 billion) was a projection of the total cost. However, according to 
the bill, funds would have to be appropriated annually. 
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Rep. McConnack declared it "the most important energy bill ever 
passed by this or any other country" (Hershey 1980). 
Funding rose, but the MFEE had changed the implicit argument 
about government support for fusion energy. No longer was this a 
pure research effort, but rather a program that declared: Controlled 
fusion was in fact technically feasible, despite the lack of demonstrat-
ed proof that this was the case; the market would be unwilling to 
develop something like a fusion reactor even though it had great 
commercial potential; and Congress knew which design would be 
the correct one. This was all quite remarkable; the course and timing 
of scientific knowledge itself was now to be guided by legislation. 
Government leaders were effectively claiming that they could induce 
a marketplace winner for a technology about which there was no 
clear evidence that any winners even existed. Money spent would 
validate this claim, it was assumed, as government had validated 
President Kennedy's promise to put a man on the moon before the 
end of the 1960s. 
Of course this analogy demonstrated only that Congress did not 
understand the great differences between a fusion reactor project 
and the Apollo moon landing. When Kennedy took office the U.S. 
had a manned space program and could lift payloads into earth orbit. 
The science of lifting them out of orbit to the moon was fairly clear, 
and only better engineering was needed to achieve that goal. Apollo 
was also intended to be simply a demonstration project with no com-
mercial intent. No firm would have undertaken such a venture when 
the assumption was that no commercial payoff was even possible. 
However, the MFEE did have a commercial purpose, a purpose 
that was to be achieved through congressional guidance and appro-
priation of funds. With a chosen design and a timetable in the bill, 
Congress had substituted political judgment for both scientific and 
market judgments. Thus, the project, originally a pure research 
effort, had become an extremely fanciful example of a government 
energy development program. 
The results were predictable. Funding rose to a high of $469 mil-
lion in 1984, but then fell as cheap conventional energy resources 
ended the panicked search for alternatives. More important, 
advances in fusion did not follow the MFEE's timetable. By 1990, so 
far from having demonstrated the prinCiples of a working fusion 
reactor, scientists conceded that the whole idea was nowhere near 
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realization. Said one physicist, "People have been saying, 'Fusion is 
30 years away-and always will be.' Except now, it seems to be 60 
years away" (Carey 1990). 
Still, promoters of fusion blamed the reduced funding for the fail-
ure to achieve the stipulated benchmarks and called for a renewed 
effort. One group of researchers argued for accelerated spending 
and promised success by 2005 (Dean et al. 1991). In fact, fusion did 
maintain research support, though at declining rates. By 2006, only 
$290 million was appropriated for fusion research of all kinds-in 
real tenus less than a third of the amount spent in 1984. The largest 
tokomak magnetic confinement project was the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), no longer even a 
U.S. project. Though accelerated fusion research and development 
continues to have its proponents, even with higher energy prices 
another crash program is very unlikely. Clearly, whatever market fail-
ure existed with respect to pure fusion research, the MFEE cmd the 
congressional effort to induce innovation failed far more dramatical-
ly. In fact, none of the benchmarks set in the original bill have ever 
been met. Increased "Apollo mode" funding today would be no more 
likely to get us there according to any timetable than it did in 1980. 
Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles 
In October 1993, President Bill Clinton cffinounced the "Clean 
Car Initiative" to "develop affordable, attractive, [family-sized] cars 
that are three times more fuel efficient than today's cars" (Clinton 
1993). Soon after, the project was renamed the Partnership for a 
New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), a joint effort of the U.S. gov-
ernment and the "Big Three" American automobile mcffiufacturers: 
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. The goal became the develop-
ment of a commercially viable car that would have ultralowemissions 
and could achieve an average 80 miles per gallon (mpg), almost four 
times the national fleet average at that time. 
Clinton explicitly evoked market failure as the rationale for tlle 
PNGY, but he was not explicit as to just what that failure entailed. 
"There are a lot of tllings we need to be working on," he said, "tllat 
market forces alone can't do" (Clinton 1993). Clinton touted the 
public-private arrangement as a means of overcoming tlle purported 
market failure while at the same time aVOiding "tlle inefficiencies, 
the bureaucracies, and the errors of government policy" by engaging 
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private-sector participation. Still, he argued that government 
brought both technological and financial expertise, presumably to 
overcome the limitations of the market (Clinton 1993). 
The nature of the market failure was spelled out more fully in a 
report for Congress (Sissine 1996). Market forces, the report argued, 
were actively discouraging development of high-mpg automobiles. 
Prices of fuel were low and consumers evinced little interest in such 
vehicles. The "failure" then was in the inability of the market to antic-
ipate changes in the demand or supply of gasoline that might in tum 
alter the demand for higher-mileage cars. There was no explicit pre-
diction of rising prices nor was it clear that the market would in fact 
be unable to respond to changes when and if they occurred. 
Nevertheless, that was the implication. A timetable was set for the 
project: production prototypes were required by 2004. 
Given that by 2006 the price of gasoline had begun to rise, one 
might argue that the market had lacked foresight. But did a govern-
ment -directed effort offer a real corrective? From the outset, there 
was reason to doubt it. As a White House press release noted, the 
PNGV presented "a technological challenge comparable to or 
greater them that involved in the Apollo project" (White House 
1993). The continual evocation of the Apollo moon program revealed 
not only the expectation of a difficult technological challenge but also 
the continuing lack of comprehension of the major distinctions 
between pure demonstration projects and commercial development. 
Certainly a car could be made that would get 80 mpg, but could it be 
produced at a cost that would induce consumers to substihlte it for 
conventional vehicles? Clearly in 1993 the answer was "no," but the 
expectation was that enough government funding would make it so. 
As early as 1996, some scientists argued that such a car would not 
be cost competitive, indeed might be as much as $40,000 more than 
a conventional vehicle, many thousands more than a car that could 
have achieved 40 mpg (Coy 1996). Still, the public-private partner-
ship persevered and its participants claimed the following year that 
there was progress, although more funding would be required to 
meet the timetable (Jewett 1997). 
In early 1998, reports suggested that the project was successfully 
achieving the intended result. In a Business Week opinion piece, 
author Robert Kuttner described several prototypes on display at an 
auto show and declared that the PNGV program was "paying real 
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dividends." Moreover, Kuttner explicitly made a market failure argu-
ment. "Clean-engine technology is a positive externality-a social 
good in which industry under-invests because the private rewards are 
too uncertain" (Kuttner 1998). 
The auto makers in one sense met the benchmark of creating pro-
totypes of high-mileage cars, but the versions they created had no 
commercial prospects. Early in the new century, it became clear that 
the real goal of a commercially viable 80-mpg car would not be 
achieved. A report from the National Research Council stated, "The 
Committee believes that no reasonable amount of funding would 
ensure achievement of [the 80 mpgJ goal. . . . Breakthrough ideas 
and talented people are more stringent constraints than money to 
achieving this goal" (National Research Council 2002). The public 
subSidy cost was about $1.5 billion in total and the PNGV did not 
work as hoped. Rather, it failed in the same way previous alternative 
energy technologies had failed. Whetller or not there was a market 
failure, government efforts provided no corrective. 
But in fact, tl1ere was evidence to suggest tl1e market failure argu-
ment was itself wrong. The PNGV consortium decided early on that 
to develop the 80-mpg car the technology of choice would be a gas-
electric hybrid engine. This type of engine, which had emerged from 
basic research conducted in the 1970s, matched a small gasoline 
engine witl1 an electric battery power plant that would be recharged 
both by the engine and by "regenerative" braking, that is, taking 
energy diSSipated in the braking process and capturing it for the bat-
tery.9 But the cars either were too expensive or not efficient enough. 
With gasoline prices relatively low, consumer demand focused on 
relatively fuel-inefficient SUVs and light trucks, and u.s. automakers 
saw little upside in expanded development funding of low-emissions, 
very-high-mpg "supercars." 
Yet ironically at this time there was commercial development of 
high-mileage gas-electriC hybrids. Toyota and Honda both intro-
duced models-Toyota, the Prius, and Honda, the two-passenger 
9Hybrid technology had been developed primmily in the 1970s initially by Victor 
Wouk through the Federal Clean Car Initiative Program and later through the 
Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 
1976, which was enacted despite President Ford's veto. These remained research 
programs mostly altllOugh patents obtained during tllis time prOvided tlle basis for 
later hybrid technology developments (Engineering and Science 2004). 
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Insight-that used this technology and obtained relatively high-mpg 
fuel economy. The Honda achieved close to 60 mpg, while the more 
family friendly Prius achieved close to 50 mpg. The irony was that 
both companies, despite rising production in the United States, were 
pointedly excluded from any part in the PN GV \0 Both introduced 
the cars even though they apparently lost a significant amount of 
money in the first years of market participation. By 2000, Honda's 
sales were only in the hundreds per year, Toyota's were better, but 
much lower than its sales of low-mpg SUVs. 
Eight years later, however, with gasoline prices reaching more 
than $4 per gallon, the millionth Prius was sold worldwide. Honda 
had abandoned the Insight but not the technology and was selling 
vigorously five-passenger hybrid Civic models that were getting 
about 50 mpg. In other words, the Japanese manufacturers took their 
own initiatives in bringing hybrid cars to market. There was no 
timetable or benchmark set by a government program, but there was 
a recognition that low energy prices were not immutable and that 
innovative high-mileage alternatives might be a useful line to pursue 
along with tlleir conventional cars and trucks. Put anotller way, mar-
ket participants follOwing their own strategies risking their own 
finances brought alternative automobile technolOgies to market, lost 
money in the short run but made profits as market conditions 
changed. The lack of foreSight of market participants, the unwilling-
ness to take risks when the prospects were uncertain, clearly did not 
apply to Toyota and Honda. They applied more aptly to the 
American Big Three, who were unwilling to employ new technolo-
gies without significant government subsidies and remained unwill-
ing even after Toyota and Honda demonstrated that the technology 
had plausible commercial potential. lI Incentives matter, and in tllis 
case it seems that government incentives were far less productive 
than market ones. Since there is a basis for comparison between the 
market's performance and the government's, the PN GV program 
lO<-yhe Japanese car makers did receive some development funding from their gov-
ernment to help them meet stringent California requirements, but it was split 
among eight car makers and was not geared toward a particularly strict programmat-
ic outcome like the PNGV (see Sissine 1996). Moreover, the decision by Honda and 
Toyota to launch commercial hybrids was made by the companies and they were not 
compensated for initial losses commercial entry entailed. 
lIFord did introduce a hybrid version ofits small SUv, the Escape, in 2004, achiev-
ing only around 30 mpg; other automakers followed later as gasoline prices rose, that 
is, once the market provided the incentives to do so. 
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seems the clearest example of government failure in energy develop-
ment programs. 
Conclusion 
Market failure is in theory a plausible argument for government 
sponsorship of alternative energy technologies. But in practice, even 
where the argument would be strongest-for example, nuclear 
fusion-there is little reason to believe that government programs 
actually have corrected the purported failures. One can certainly 
imagine the benefits that would result from successful development 
of new technologies, but history has demonstrated that government 
energy programs reach for more than they are ever likely achieve, 
and end up misallocating resources. 
This historical record is pertinent today. Less than two years ago, 
an ethanol program was adopted that appears to embody all of the 
unfortunate characteristics of the programs for synfuels, fusion, and 
the high-mileage automobile. The program mandates technological 
progress according to a timetable with a goal of commercialization. 
The ethanol legislation, the Energy Independence and Security Act, 
as passed in late 2007 stipulates that by 2022 the United States will 
consume 36 billion gallons of ethanol annually, but to meet this goal 
there must be rapid commercialization of ethanol from cellulosic 
feedstocks. While the technology exists, it is not nearly cost compet-
itive with conventional fossil fuel resources and requires break-
throughs of the type that stymied previous alternative energy efforts 
(Grossman 2008). 
And more of these sorts of policies seem likely in the years ahead. 
During his campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama called for 
production of 60 billion gallons of ethanol by 2030, 1 million plug-in 
hybrid cars on the road by 2015, and 25 percent of electricity from 
renewable sources by 2025. He vowed to spend $150 billion on new 
technolOgies despite the fact that government spending has never 
produced any viable alternative energy products. 
Faced with an economic recession, President Obama has focused 
mostly on the vacuous idea of "green jobs" (Morriss et al. 2009) while 
still pledging to spend $150 billion over 10 years to "transition to a 
clean energy economy" (White House 2009). But tlle grounds for 
tllese expenditures are no different from tlle ones tllat gave us the 
synfuels, fusion, etllanol, and PNGV programs. Government still 
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believes that energy markets are deficient because they are not tran-
sitioning to "a clean energy economy" on their own. But there is not 
the slightest reason to believe that that analysis is any more correct 
today than it has been for the last 35 years. Even if there is some sort 
of market imperfection, government is not likely to provide an 
improvement. Indeed, government failure, with its attendlmt waste 
of resources, seems certain to be the outcome. 
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